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 R. v. Powley:  
Building a Foundation for the 
Constitutional Recognition of Métis 
Aboriginal Rights 
Lori Sterling and Peter Lemmond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 22, 1993, Steve and Roddy Powley shot a bull moose 
just north of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. A week later, provincial conser-
vation officers charged them for hunting moose without a licence and 
possession of unlawfully hunted moose. In their defence, they asserted 
that they are Métis1 and as such, have a constitutional Aboriginal right 
to hunt for food. Almost fully 10 years later, on September 19, 2003, the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld their rights. This decision marked 
both the end of a long legal process extending across four levels of 
court, and the beginning of newly-recognized constitutional rights held 
by Métis under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it will sketch out the 
essential elements of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. 
Powley.2 What is conspicuous about the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
approach is how much it endeavours to follow the existing jurisprudence 
dealing with First Nations. Next, the paper will highlight other possible 
approaches to section 35 Métis Aboriginal rights that were before the 
Court but were not referred to in its reasons. Finally, this paper will 
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1
  For the purposes of this article, “Métis” (capitalized) is used to refer to persons or 
communities that hold Aboriginal rights as Métis under the Powley test.  
2
  2003 SCC 43, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43 [hereinafter “Powley”]. 
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canvas those parts of the test that are most likely to generate future liti-
gation involving the Métis in Ontario.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE POWLEY DECISION 
Given its landmark significance as the only final appellate court de-
cision in any common law jurisdiction addressing constitutionally-
entrenched Métis Aboriginal rights, the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Powley is both concise and surprisingly devoid of aca-
demic or jurisprudential references. It is only 55 paragraphs long, ap-
plies only one decision and refers to only two others. As a result, this 
decision might be described as a sound but circumscribed initial step in 
the development of a test for Métis Aboriginal rights.  
Reduced to essentials, Powley transposes the test for addressing In-
dian assertions of Aboriginal rights laid out in R. v. Van der Peet,3 to the 
determination of Métis Aboriginal rights by modifying the timing re-
quirement from a time prior to contact with Europeans to a time preced-
ing the establishment of effective European control.4 Thus, while the 
purpose of section 35 for First Nations is to give recognition of rights 
held at the time of contact with Europeans, the purpose of the inclusion 
of Métis is more open-ended. It is: 
…based on a commitment to recognizing the Métis and enhancing their 
survival as distinctive communities. The purpose and the promise of s. 35 
is to protect practices that were historically important features of these 
distinctive communities and that persist in the present day as integral 
elements of their Métis culture.5 [Emphasis added.] 
Similar to the test for establishing First Nation Aboriginal rights, the 
establishment of Métis Aboriginal rights requires: 
 
• an accurate description of the alleged Aboriginal right; 
 
• establishment of a historic rights bearing Métis community at a 
particular point in time which has continued into the modern day; 
                                                                                                                                
3
  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]. 
4
  Powley, supra, note 2, at paras. 10, 14, 17-18 and 36-40. 
5
  Id., at para. 13. 
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• proof of a claimant’s membership in the contemporary Métis 
community; 
 
• evidence that an Aboriginal practice was integral to the claim-
ant’s distinctive historic community culture and has been carried 
through to the modern day by the community; 
 
• no extinguishment of the right by treaty or other government 
conduct; and 
 
• where the right was infringed, no justification of that infringe-
ment. 
 
Applying the above approach, the Supreme Court in Powley con-
cluded that “the right being claimed can…be characterized as the right 
to hunt for food in the environs of Sault Ste. Marie”.6 Importantly, this 
was not a case about commercial hunting or fishing. The evidence was 
that the moose was for personal use.  
After determining the nature of the Aboriginal right in issue, the 
Supreme Court then turned its attention to identifying the historic and 
contemporary rights bearing Métis community. Although this paper will 
explore in Part III the meaning of “community” in more detail, suffice it 
to note at this point that the Court held that “demographic evidence, 
proof of shared customs, traditions, and a collective identity is required 
to demonstrate the existence of a Métis community that can support a 
claim to site-specific aboriginal rights”.7 In this case, both sides recog-
nized that there had been a historic Métis community at Sault Ste. Marie 
that had emerged by the early 19th century.  
With respect to a modern day Métis community, the Court required 
little evidence of its existence. Indeed, it held that the Sault Ste. Marie 
Métis community’s lack of political or social visibility from the early 
1900s onward did not mean that it did not continue to exist. The Court 
was prepared to accept that the community existed continuously primar-
ily on the basis of the presence of Métis organizations in the area and 
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7
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the fact that there were Métis families in the vicinity who had kinship 
ties. 
Turning to the issue of verifying the claimants’ membership in the 
contemporary Sault Ste. Marie Métis community, the Court sought to 
ensure that only Métis having ancestral connections to the historic Métis 
community could lay claim to section 35 Aboriginal rights. It held that it 
would look “to three broad factors as indicia of Métis identity for the 
purpose of claiming Métis rights under s. 35: self-identification, ances-
tral connection and community acceptance”.8 Each of these criteria must 
be met before membership can be established. The Court also noted that 
evidence of longstanding identification and adoption of community 
culture, customs and tradition are required to demonstrate membership. 
In Powley, there was solid genealogical evidence that the Powleys de-
scended directly from the Lesage family, one of the early Sault Ste. 
Marie Métis families. It was therefore not necessary to discuss non-
hereditary ways in which membership could be established. 
Because the Powleys’ ancestors were members of the Batchewana 
Band from the 1850s to around 1918 and received benefits under the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon 
to address the effect of this history on the Powleys’ ability to enjoy 
Métis Aboriginal rights. The Court held that the “fact that the Powleys’ 
ancestors lived on an Indian reserve for a period of time does not negate 
the Powleys’ Métis identity….[w]e emphasize that the individual deci-
sion by a Métis person’s ancestors to take treaty benefits does not neces-
sarily extinguish that person’s claim to Métis rights. It will depend, in 
part, on whether there was a collective adhesion by the Métis commu-
nity to the treaty”.9 In this case, because there had been no collective 
adhesion, it could not be said that the historic community had relin-
quished its rights. 
This point has interesting potential consequences for First Nations. 
For example, in the Sault Ste. Marie area there are First Nations mem-
bers that have Métis origins. The Court left open the possibility that 
these First Nation members may be able to assert Métis Aboriginal 
rights in addition to or instead of treaty rights. 
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  Id., at para. 30. 
9
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The heart of the Powley decision is found in the discussion of the 
relevant time frame for assessing when a Métis community must come 
into existence before it can lay claim to section 35 rights. All parties 
before the Court recognized that the point of contact test applicable to 
First Nations would not provide for Aboriginal rights for the Métis as it 
would not allow for the ethno-genesis of a Métis community. The ques-
tion then became how far forward should the “clock” move to allow for 
Métis community rights. At one extreme, it was suggested that the mere 
existence of a modern day Métis community would suffice. At the other 
extreme, it was suggested that section 35 was never intended to create 
Métis Aboriginal rights and was limited to assertions of Métis treaty 
rights. In the middle ground were two possible options for the time by 
which the community must have existed: at the point of the assertion of 
British sovereignty and the point of effective European control. The 
Court chose the latter: 
…the test for Métis practices should focus on identifying those practices, 
customs and traditions that are integral to the Métis community’s 
distinctive existence and relationship to the land. This unique history can 
most appropriately be accommodated by a post contact but pre-control test 
that identifies the time when Europeans effectively established political 
and legal control in a particular area. The focus should be on the period 
after a particular Métis community arose and before it came under the 
effective control of European laws and customs. This pre-control test 
enables us to identify those practices, customs and traditions that predate 
the imposition of European laws and customs on the Métis.10 [Emphasis 
added.] 
With respect to the Sault Ste. Marie area, the Supreme Court found 
the relevant date of effective European control to be approximately 
1850. There was no dispute that the point of European assertion of sov-
ereignty had been around 1763, prior to the emergence of a distinct 
Sault Ste. Marie Métis community. As discussed in the following sec-
tion of this paper, the legal test of assertion of sovereignty had been 
referred to by members of the Court in earlier Aboriginal cases but it 
was not mentioned by the Court in Powley. By 1850, however, there 
was no dispute that a Métis community had formed in Sault Ste. Marie. 
In fact, it was at its peak in terms of population and cultural develop-
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  Id., at para. 37. 
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ment. Shortly after 1850, the community dispersed, with many members 
moving onto the nearby reserves. 
The Supreme Court also upheld the trial judge’s finding that hunting 
for food was integral to the historic Métis way of life at Sault Ste. Marie 
in the period just prior to 1850.11 This is an interesting finding since 
moose were on the verge of extinction at that time. The Métis hunting 
that did occur then involved mostly rabbits and other small animals. 
Moose hunting did not start in earnest until much later, once the popula-
tion had recovered. This aspect of the decision would appear to confirm 
that subsistence harvesting activities are to be assessed in general rather 
than specific terms (e.g., hunting or fishing generally rather than hunting 
or fishing for particular species).12  
Having concluded that the Powleys enjoy an Aboriginal right as 
Métis to hunt for food, the Court found that Ontario’s regulatory scheme 
infringed this right and that this infringement was not justified. The 
Court concluded that there had been a blanket denial of a Métis right to 
hunt for food that could not be justified.13 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO  
MÉTIS RIGHTS NOT DISCUSSED BY THE COURT 
As noted above, one of the central findings of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Powley is that the time frame relevant to identify Métis Abo-
riginal rights protected under section 35 is “the period after a particular 
Métis community arose and before it came under the effective control of 
European laws and custom”.14 Despite the critical importance of this 
aspect of the Powley test, the Court provides little explanation of why, 
as a matter of law, it is the appropriate measure of Métis Aboriginal 
rights, and more particularly, why it is more appropriate than the asser-
tion of sovereignty approach. 
The Court explains the relevant time frame for identifying Métis 
Aboriginal rights as being a necessary consequence of the purpose of 
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  Id., at paras. 19-20, 41 and 43. 
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  This approach may have ramifications for First Nations who have, at times, had their 
activities assessed in more specific terms, e.g., herring spawn on kelp in R. v. Gladstone, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. 
13
  Id., at paras. 47-50. 
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  Id., at para. 37. 
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section 35 as it pertains to the Métis, stating that “[t]he constitutionally 
significant feature of the Métis is their special status as peoples that 
emerged between first contact and the effective imposition of European 
control”.15 It further found that: 
Section 35 requires that we recognize and protect those customs and 
traditions that were historically important features of Métis communities 
prior to the time of effective European control, and that persist in the 
present day. This modification is required to account for the unique post-
contact emergence of Métis communities, and the post-contact foundation 
of their aboriginal rights.16 
Why it is that section 35 “requires” the recognition and protection of 
the historically important features of Métis communities prior to the 
time of effective European control is not clearly stated. Although the 
Court’s conclusion is neither surprising (it had been recommended by 
the respondent from trial) nor unreasonable (there was a reference to the 
concept of the imposition of European laws and customs in McLachlin 
J.’s dissenting reasons in Van der Peet),17 it is curious that such an im-
portant conclusion was reached without much in the way of an examina-
tion or explanation of its juridical foundations. The main problems with 
the absence of any detailed discussion of the jurisprudential underpin-
ning to the decision are that it could diminish the ability to predict how 
unanswered questions will be resolved in the future and to ensure the 
consistency that has informed much traditional common law judicial 
reasoning. 
Prior to this decision, the Court had moored the common law of 
Aboriginal title to the assertion of British sovereignty. Thus, in Delga-
muukw v. British Columbia,18 the date of the assertion of British sover-
eignty was used for First Nations claims. This could easily have been 
transposed to the context of Métis Aboriginal rights. As Ontario, Canada 
and other governments argued at the Supreme Court of Canada in Pow-
ley, the assertion of sovereignty is also recognized in the wider body of 
common law dealing with Aboriginal interests and the Supreme Court’s 
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  Id., at para. 17. 
16
  Id., at para. 18. 
17
  Van der Peet, supra, note 3, at paras. 247-48. 
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  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108. 
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own decisions19 as being significant when ascertaining the Aboriginal 
rights and title. Further, in R. v. Morin, the lower court had looked to the 
assertion of sovereignty as the relevant time frame in recognizing a 
Métis Aboriginal harvesting right.20 
In the absence of express reasoning, it is left to inference to explain 
why it is that the Supreme Court of Canada chose effective European 
control as the relevant date for identifying Métis Aboriginal rights. One 
possible rationale is that an underlying objective of section 35 is to 
provide as wide as possible an opportunity for a Métis community to 
come into existence and assert section 35 rights. Having accepted that 
the inclusion of the Métis in section 35 must mean that Métis enjoy 
protected Aboriginal rights, the Court appears to have wished to avoid 
treating potential Métis communities in eastern and central Canada, 
where the assertion of British sovereignty arguably occurred earlier, 
differently than Métis communities further west, and adopted a test that 
would attain this end. 
On the facts of Powley itself, choosing the date of assertion of sov-
ereignty may well have meant that there were no section 35 Métis com-
munity rights because the Sault Ste. Marie community likely did not 
come into existence until after 1763, the date of assertion of sover-
eignty. In 1763, the Treaty of Paris ceded jurisdiction over an area in-
cluding Sault Ste. Marie to the British Crown. In contrast, effective 
control was held to be tied to the signing of treaties between the British 
Crown and First Nations and large scale European immigration which 
occurred much later, soon after 1850. By looking to effective control, 
the Court was able to recognize the existence of section 35 Métis 
Aboriginal rights in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie. 
The consequence of this approach is that the Aboriginal rights of the 
earliest Aboriginal peoples of Canada may encompass a considerably 
narrower range of practices and may be significantly harder to establish 
than those of the Métis. First Nation societies at the point of European 
contact were far less likely to have engaged in activities reflecting a 
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  Especially in Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue-M.N.R.), [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 911, at paras. 10 and 62 (per McLachlin C.J.) and 114, 141-47, and 156-59 (per 
Binnie J.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33 and Delgamuukw, id., at paras. 143-48. 
20
  R. v. Morin and Daigneault, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, at 165, [1996] S.J. No. 262 
(Prov. Ct.), affd (1997), 159 Sask. R. 161, at 165, [1997] S.J. No. 529 (Q.B.) [hereinafter 
“Morin”]. 
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European influence, such as commercial trading, than when effective 
control was ultimately established. For example, in the case of Sault Ste. 
Marie, over 200 years separate the point of European contact from that 
of effective control, during which time trading networks became more 
extensive, sophisticated and commercial. Similarly, the oral evidence 
and historical records from the time frame of when effective control was 
established are far more voluminous than those available from the point 
of European contact.  
This then raises the question as to whether the point of contact test 
itself will survive for First Nations. Will there be a perceived unfairness 
if Métis Aboriginal rights are established at a time when commercial 
activity was generally more prevalent among all Aboriginal peoples? 
First Nations communities typically do not appear to have engaged in 
the same kind of commerce at the time of contact. Certainly, the Métis 
time frame of pre-control would have made a difference to the determi-
nation of the Sto:lo First Nation’s Aboriginal right to trade fish in the 
Van der Peet case.  
A second area the Supreme Court chose not to discuss was the ap-
proach taken to persons of mixed ancestry found in common law jurispru-
dence, particularly from other jurisdictions.21 With the submissions of the 
parties and 17 intervenors, the Court had a rich vein of materials to draw 
upon to sketch the jurisprudential foundations of its reasons. Much of that 
material, however, demonstrated that persons of mixed ancestry were not 
recognized as a distinct class of rights-holders holding distinct rights.  
The Supreme Court’s reluctance in Powley to refer extensively to 
existing jurisprudence is not typical of its past practice in landmark 
Aboriginal rights cases. By way of example, in Van der Peet, which, 
like Powley, articulated for the first time the legal principles that are to 
be applied in identifying the Aboriginal rights held by a class of section 
35 rights holders, Lamer C.J. (as he then was) considered many deci-
                                                                                                                                
21
  Ontario referred to 14 Canadian decisions, 16 imperial (United Kingdom) decisions, 
15 Australian and New Zealand decisions, two United States decisions, three international 
tribunal decisions, 23 Canadian statutes, two Canadian treaties, 15 United States treaties, six 
journal articles, 10 legal texts, and numerous extracts from the Report of the Royal Commis-
sion on Aboriginal Peoples, although it is not clear how much of this was accepted as admis-
sible by the Court. These materials reached back to the mid-16th century (Buckley v. Rice 
Thomas (1554), 1 Plowden 118, 75 E.R. 182 (K.B.)) and provided a good overview of the 
development of the law of Aboriginal rights. 
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sions and academic articles22 and extensively discussed the jurispruden-
tial underpinnings of the common law of Aboriginal rights.  
There are several possible reasons for the absence of reference to ju-
risprudence from both inside and outside Canada. To begin, it may re-
flect the extent to which Powley represents a first exploration of what is 
truly legal terra incognito, and also perhaps the Court’s admonishment 
that “[a]lthough s. 35 protects ‘existing’ rights, it is more than a mere 
codification of the common law. Section 35 reflects a new promise: a 
constitutional commitment to protecting practices that were historically 
important features of particular aboriginal communities”.23 It may also 
reflect a desire to provide a concise, plainly written decision that is more 
accessible to the general public. Finally, the Court may have thought 
that the jurisprudence had already been fleshed out in First Nations 
cases, although this does not explain the limited discussion of the ra-
tionale for the effective control approach. 
IV. AREAS RIPE FOR FUTURE LITIGATION 
Although the Powley decision raises a considerable number of issues 
that may ultimately be litigated, this article proposes to focus on two; 
namely, the identification of historic rights bearing Métis communities 
and the verification of individual membership in a Métis community. This 
is because these two issues raise practical and evidentiary concerns that 
both governments and the Métis are grappling with at present and that 
must be resolved quickly in order to avoid extensive litigation. 
1. The Meaning of Community  
The existence of distinctive historic Métis communities forms the core 
of the constitutional protection afforded Métis rights under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained: 
The inclusion of the Métis in s. 35 is based on a commitment to 
recognizing the Métis and enhancing their survival as distinctive 
communities. The purpose and the promise of s. 35 is to protect practices 
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  In Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, Lamer C.J. referred to 26 
decisions and 35 authors of academic articles. 
23
  Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 45, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
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that were historically important features of these distinctive communities 
and that persist in the present day as integral elements of their Métis 
culture.24 [Emphasis added.] 
Although the Court in Powley acknowledged that different groups 
of Métis exhibit their own distinctive traits and traditions and may there-
fore be referred to as “peoples”, it found that “it is only necessary for 
our purposes to verify that the claimants belong to an identifiable Métis 
community with a sufficient degree of continuity and stability to support 
a site-specific aboriginal right”.25 In other words, although there may be 
larger Métis peoples, in order to determine section 35 Métis Aboriginal 
rights, one must look for a site-specific historic Métis community.  
This conclusion remains the subject of debate. Some Métis groups 
appear to prefer to dispense with the site-specific community require-
ment and instead, would have Métis dealt with on the basis that they 
belong to a people who live generally within a larger territory, e.g., the 
Great Lakes environs. The fact that Métis may exist as broader territo-
rial peoples is certainly relevant to the section 35 analysis but is not 
likely a sufficient or necessary basis upon which to dispense with the 
requirement for historic site-specific Métis communities. The wider 
concept of “peoples” may be relevant to determining the characteristics 
of a particular community. Thus, for example, the Michif language as a 
trait of a site specific community may not have to be proved based on 
specific evidence of each community where the evidence is clear that a 
community belonged to a wider people or “nation” that spoke Michif. 
Such an approach would seem to be especially warranted where it ap-
pears that the shortfall in community specific evidence can be attributed 
to a particular deficiency in the historical record such as the destruction 
of relevant fur trade post records. More generally, the close connection 
between the concepts of distinct “peoples” and distinct ethnic “commu-
nities” suggest that the factors used to identify the existence of distinct 
“peoples” also are likely to be of some value in identifying distinct 
communities. Nevertheless, the fact that one can draw inferences about 
a community based on traits of the peoples more generally is not a basis 
upon which to suggest that all communities within a broader territory 
are the same or must hold identical rights. To find otherwise would 
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  Id., at para. 13. 
25
  Id., at para. 12. 
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certainly deviate from the approach to the definition of community 
previously adopted by the Courts in the First Nations’ rights context. 
Notwithstanding the central importance it placed on specific historic 
Métis communities, the Supreme Court in Powley provided only very 
general guidance as to what is required to demonstrate the existence of a 
distinctive historic Métis community. It noted that “‘Métis’…refers to 
distinctive peoples who, in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed 
their own customs, way of life, and recognizable group identity separate 
from their Indian or Inuit and European forebears”.26 It further explained 
that there must be a “distinctive collective identity, shared geographic 
location and common way of life”.27 
In order to more fully develop the criteria that demonstrate the exis-
tence of historic Métis communities, it is necessary to draw upon other 
sources. The decisions of the lower courts and the record in Powley are 
an obvious starting point. For example, the Court of Appeal noted that a 
community cannot be a political organization:  
Neither OMAA nor the MNO constitute the sort of discrete, historic and 
site-specific community contemplated by Van der Peet capable of holding 
a constitutionally protected aboriginal right.28 
The Court of Appeal further described what the historic Métis 
community at Sault Ste. Marie looked like. It noted that the majority of 
inhabitants were of mixed ancestry and that the community was a “hub 
of early fur trade activity”.29 As well, the Métis occupied a distinctive 
niche in the fur trade economy as wage earners, skilled tradesmen and 
farmers. They were more sedentary than the local Ojibway, and most 
important, they had a distinct culture with separate community struc-
tures, mode of dress, musical traditions and language.30 
The Superior Court in Powley looked to Black’s Law Dictionary,31 
for a definition of “community” in dealing with the issue of whether 
there is a present day Métis community: 
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  Id., at para. 10. 
27
  Id., at para. 12. 
28
  (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at para. 144, [2001] O.J. No. 607 (C.A.). 
29
  Id., at para. 18. 
30
  Id., at paras. 18-20. 
31
  6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990). 
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Neighborhood; vicinity; synonymous with locality. . . . People who reside 
in a locality in more or less proximity. A society or body of people living 
in the same place, under the same laws and regulations, who have 
common rights, privileges, or interests. . . . It connotes a congeries of 
common interests arising from associations — social, business, religious, 
governmental, scholastic, recreational.32 [Emphasis added.] 
In spite of this definition, which begins with a physical site-specific 
proximity, the Superior Court focused ultimately on evidence of kinship. 
The court relied heavily on the evidence of defence “community wit-
nesses” that spoke about shared family roots. In addition, these witnesses 
discussed shared economic and cultural activities. By way of example, 
one witness is quoted in the decision as being part of a community that 
was centred on music, picnics with berry picking and hunting.33 
Finally, the trial judge emphasized cultural attributes, noting that the 
customs, practices and traditions of the Métis were distinctive and sepa-
rate from the Ojibway. The court remarked that the Métis were “visu-
ally, culturally and ethnically distinct”.34 This point is well illustrated by 
the evidence of an expert cited by the court: 
These people [referring to the Métis] were neither adjunct relative-members of 
tribal villages nor the standard bearers of European civilization in the 
wilderness. Increasingly, they stood apart or, more precisely, in between. By 
the end of the last struggle for empire in 1815, their towns which were 
visually, ethnically and culturally distinct from neighbouring Indian villages 
and “white towns” along the eastern seaboard, stretched from Detroit and 
Michilimakinae at the east to the Red River at the northwest. ... such towns 
grew as a result of and were increasingly dominated by the offspring of 
Canadian trade employees and Indian women who, having reached their 
majority, were intermarrying among themselves and rearing successive 
generations of Métis these communities did not represent an extension of 
French, and later British colonial culture, but rather “adaption[s] to the Upper 
Great Lakes environment”.35 [Emphasis added.] 
In addition to the decisions and the record in Powley, there are a va-
riety of other sources to look to for help in defining the concept of 
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  (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 30, at para. 53, [2000] O.J. No. 99 (S.C.J.). 
33
  Id., at para. 34. 
34
  Powley, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at paras. 75-76 (Prov. Div.).  
35
  Exhibit #31, Dr. Ray’s Supporting Documents, vol. 3, Tab 7, Many Roads to Red 
River by Jacqueline Peterson, at 41, cited in Powley, reasons at trial, id., at para. 76. 
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community. The decisions dealing with Métis rights from the western 
provinces have shed little light thus far on the issue of what identifies a 
historic Métis community.36 This reflects the fact that in most of these 
cases, the primary issue has been whether the individual qualifies as an 
“Indian” for the purposes of one of the Natural Resources Transfer 
Agreements (“NRTA”) of 1930, and the Métis identity of the defendant 
has been conceded by the Crown.37 The notable exceptions are Morin 
and the trial decision in Blais.38  
                                                                                                                                
36
  R. v. Budd, [1979] 6 W.W.R. 45; R. v. Ferguson, [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 148, [1993] A.J. 
No. 190 (Prov. Ct.), affd [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 117, [1993] A.J. No. 1064 (Q.B.); R. v. McPher-
son (1994), 90 Man. R. (2d) 290, [1994] M.J. No. 750 (Q.B.); R. v. Desjarlais [1996] 1 
C.N.L.R. 148, [1995] A.J. No. 1324 (Prov. Ct.), distinguished [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 113, [1995] 
A.J. No. 1320 (Q.B.); R. v. Grumbo, [1996] 10 W.W.R. 170, [1996] S.J. No. 504 (Q.B.), revd 
[1999] 1 W.W.R. 9, [1998] S.J. No. 331 (C.A.); R. v. Blais, [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 109, [1996] 
M.J. No. 391 (Prov. Ct.), affd (1998) 130 Man. R. (2d) 114, [1998] M.J. No. 395 (Q.B.), affd 
(2001) 156 Man. R. (2d) 53 (C.A.), affd 2003 SCC 44, [2001] M.J. No. 168 [hereinafter 
“Blais”]; and R. v. Howse, [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 228, [2000] B.C.J. No. 905 (P.C.), revd 2002 
BCSC 235, [2002] B.C.J. No. 379 (S.C.), leave to appeal granted 2003 BCCA 152, [2003] 
B.C.J. No. 508 (S.C) [hereinafter “Howse”]. 
37
  These cases generally confirm the importance of a shared mode of life, including cul-
tural and economic practices and activities. By way of example, in R. v. Desjarlais, id., the 
Court of Queen’s Bench looked to ancestry and to an “Indian mode of life” in addressing the 
question of whether the defendants were Indians within the protection of the NRTA:  
While the Ferguson Court did not attempt to establish an exhaustive list of factors 
which constitute following an Indian mode of life, the Crown submitted that the 
Court in Ferguson established certain necessary elements. There must be a connec-
tion with the Indian language; there must be a connection with an Indian commu-
nity; there must be self-identification by the individual in question as an Indian; 
there must be a connection with traditional Indian food gathering techniques such as 
hunting and trapping and fishing; there must be a connection with traditional Indian 
customs, on religion, philosophy and lifestyle. Ferguson does not determine the ex-
act nature of such connections.[Emphasis added.] 
This analysis is directed to determining the standing of an individual rather than a group or 
class of people. However, it is probative of the issue of community identification because commu-
nities of course are based on ties between individuals, and the connections that serve to identify a 
person as a member of an Aboriginal community therefore are very closely intertwined with the 
connections that serve to demarcate the existence of a community. In this particular case, the 
connections looked to by the court are broadly similar to those that can be gleaned from the Powley 
decisions and other sources, e.g., shared cultural and harvesting practices as manifested through 
constituent elements such as harvesting activities, shared customs and religious traditions. 
38
  In Howse, the issue was disposed of on appeal primarily on the basis of an absence of 
evidence of an Aboriginal right. In Dumont v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 
17 [hereinafter “Dumont”]. The Manitoba Métis Federation has sought a “declaration that the 
federal...statutes and orders-in-council...were unconstitutional measures that had the purpose 
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In Morin, the trial judge found that the Métis “people of Turnor 
Lake are currently living as a community and basically off the land as 
they have since the early 1800’s”.39 In reaching this conclusion, he re-
marked that the Métis sprang from the fur trade and their geographic 
territory was marked by fur trading posts.40 In Blais, the trial judge sim-
ply concluded that Métis in the Red River Settlement were an organized 
society.41 However, he also appended to his decision a lengthy summary 
of the evidence tendered at trial, including the report of an expert deal-
ing with “Origins or Ethnogenesis of the Métis” which, once again, tied 
the Métis communities to fur trading posts and activity.  
Five Métis Aboriginal rights cases have been addressed by courts in 
New Brunswick in the last three years.42 In all four cases, the New 
Brunswick courts have rejected assertions of Métis rights at least in part 
on the basis that the claimants have not established that there was a 
historic Métis community. However, these findings for the most part 
have rested on a generalized consideration of the basic inadequacy of 
the evidence tendered on behalf of the claimants rather than a specific 
assessment of what factors inform the determination of whether a his-
toric Métis community existed.43 The evidence led by the claimants 
generally has taken the form of unsupported and vague assertions by lay 
witnesses. As a result, these cases generally shed little light on what 
factors might serve to identify a historic Métis community.  
Although the case law is not advanced on the issue of community 
definition, Professor Bell has thoroughly addressed the issue in “Who 
                                                                                                                                
and effect of stripping the Métis of the land base promised to them under Sections 31 and 32 
of the Manitoba Act, 1870”. The earlier proceedings in the case dealt primarily with a pre-
liminary motion to strike the claim. In dealing with this motion on appeal, O’Sullivan J.A (in 
dissent) remarked that the Métis possessed a sufficient self-awareness of their existence as a 
people to maintain law and order through a provisional government. 
39
  Morin, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, at 167, [1996] S.J. No. 262 (Prov. Ct.). 
40
  Morin, id., at 166. 
41
  Blais, supra, note 36, at 133 (Man. Prov. Ct.). 
42
  R. v. Chiasson, 2001 NBPC 5, [2001] N.B.J. No. 87 (affd by N.B.Q.B. no reported 
reasons); R. v. Castonguay, 2002 NBPC 1, [2002] N.B.J. No. 447 (Prov. Ct.), 2003 NBQB 
325, [2003] N.B.J. No. 350 (Q.B.); R. v. Castonguay, 2002 NBPC 26, [2002] N.B.J. No. 362 
(Prov. Ct.) (hereinafter “Castonguay No. 2”); and R. v. Daigle, 2003 NBPC 4, [2003] N.B.J. 
No. 65 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Hopper, [2004] N.B.J. No. 107 (Prov. Ct.). 
43
  Chiasson, id., at paras. 20, 29; Castonguay, id., at paras. 36-51, 55 (espec. para. 51) 
(Prov. Ct.) and at para. 16 (N.B.Q.B.), Castonguay No. 2, id., at paras. 55, 61-65; and Daigle, 
id., at paras. 30-38; Hopper, id., at paras. 10 and 21. 
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are the Métis People in Section 35 (2)?”.44 At the risk of oversimplifica-
tion, her analysis is primarily directed to identifying and evaluating 
competing definitions of Métis,45 and concludes by recommending that 
Métis be defined as the descendants of the historic Métis Nation centred 
on the Red River Settlement or people associated with ongoing Métis 
[mixed ancestry] collectives. The Supreme Court of Canada appears to 
have broadly agreed and accepted that Métis peoples may extend be-
yond the Red River group.46 Professor Bell also sets out general criteria 
for “peoples” that are helpful for identifying specific communities.47 
These include common history, ethnicity, culture, language, religion, 
ideology and economic base. In addition, she suggests that a sufficient 
number of people may be required, although what that number is cannot 
be pre-determined.  
Finally, the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(“RCAP Report”) appears to be exerting a strong influence on the 
courts, especially in respect to Métis cases.48 Its relevance on the spe-
cific issue of identifying historic Métis communities would seem to be 
three-fold. First, it specifically identifies a number of historic Métis 
communities including Sault Ste. Marie, Rainy River and Moose Fac-
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  (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 351. 
45
  Id., at 374. Professor Bell lists the following definitions as some of the broad choices 
for defining the term Métis: 
 
1.  Anyone of mixed Indian/non-Indian blood who is not a status Indian; 
2.  A person who identifies as Métis and is accepted by a successor community of the 
Métis Nation; 
3.  A person who identifies as Métis and is accepted by a self-identifying Métis com-
munity; 
4.  Persons who took, or were entitled to take, half-breed grants under the Manitoba Act 
or Dominion Lands Act, and their descendants; and 
5.  Descendants of persons excluded from the Indian Act regime by virtue of a way of 
life criterion. 
46
  Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at paras. 11-12, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
47
  Supra, note 44, at 364. 
48
  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples [hereinafter “RCAP Report”]. See the rea-
sons at trial in Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at para. 77, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, the reasons 
of the Superior Court (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 30, at paras. 44, 58, and 63, [2000] O.J. No. 99, 
the reasons of the Court of Appeal (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at paras. 101-102, 132, 134-35 
and 151, [2001] O.J. No. 607; and the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada at, 2003 SCC 
43, at para. 10, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
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tory.49 Second, the RCAP Report recounts the historical origins of a 
Métis identity as largely being communities that developed over time 
adjacent to fur trading posts and ultimately, converging at the forks of 
the Red and Assiniboine rivers.50 Third, the RCAP Report specifically 
addresses the criteria that should be used to identify who qualifies as a 
“people” under section 35. It does so by citing the criteria used by the 
International Commission of Jurists (and referred to in the Bell article) 
above and stressing the importance of the subjective characteristic of “a 
sense of community”.51  
In conclusion, a number of elements relevant to identifying historic 
Métis communities at a general or conceptual level appear repeatedly in 
sources discussed above. Of these, the most crucial (as a matter of fre-
quency and the importance attached to them) seem to be: 
 
(1) population of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry; 
(2)  culture based on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal sources; 
(3)  social ties, especially kinship ties involving intermarriage among 
families of mixed ancestry; 
(4)  economic ties, typically involving a distinct economic niche in-
corporating both Aboriginal and European activities and prac-
tices; 
(5)  site specific physical presence; and 
(6) manifestation of some sense of self-awareness as a distinct com-
munity that is neither Indian nor European. 
 
As applied to the Sault Ste. Marie Métis, the community in 1850 
had many of the above characteristics. In particular, the culture was 
marked by musical tradition of voyageur songs, distinct Métis fiddling 
and dances. There was a distinct mode of dress that included wearing 
the sash, the capote and a general mixture of European and Indian 
clothes. The inhabitants would likely have spoken some Michif as well 
as native and European languages, and would have followed the Roman 
Catholic faith. They typically lived in timber homes on long, narrow lots 
fronting on the river. They had kinship connections among core families 
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  RCAP Report, id., at vol. 4, at 259-60. 
50
  RCAP Report, id., at vol. 2, at 150. 
51
  RCAP Report, id., at vol. 4, at 298. 
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and practised endogamous marriage patterns. Most important, the com-
munity shared an occupational interest in the fur trade.  
2.  Individual Membership in the Modern Métis Community 
(a) The Legal Test 
Once a historic and contemporary Métis community has been found, 
the person claiming a Métis Aboriginal right is required to establish that 
he or she is entitled to exercise the Métis community’s Aboriginal 
rights. Because Canadian courts thus far have been called upon to ad-
dress Aboriginal rights claims typically involving persons recognized as 
Indians under the Indian Act or as members of statutorily recognized 
bands, they have not been required to seriously consider individual 
entitlement.  
In contrast, because there is no formal structure such as a band for 
most Métis or a unanimously adopted definition of who is Métis, the 
Court in Powley has developed a common law legal test for identifying 
Métis Aboriginal rights holders. The criteria for demonstrating member-
ship in a community at common law are self-identification, ancestral 
connection and community acceptance.  
Turning to the first requirement, the Supreme Court cautioned that 
“self-identification should not be of recent vintage: While an individ-
ual’s self-identification need not be static or monolithic, claims that are 
made belatedly in order to benefit from a s. 35 right will not satisfy the 
self-identification requirement”.52 By stressing that self-identification 
must be longstanding, the Court sought to avert opportunistic identifica-
tion as Métis by individuals of mixed ancestry who have tenuous con-
nections to Métis communities. 
The criterion of an ancestral connection is perhaps the most contro-
versial and the Court was careful not to cast its contours in stone. In-
stead, it highlighted that the purpose of the ancestral connection of the 
claimant to the historic community was to ensure that there was a “real 
link”. It further noted that while it would not require a minimum “blood 
quantum”, it would “require some proof that the claimant’s ancestors 
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  Powley, supra, note 48, at para. 31 (S.C.C.). 
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belonged to the historic Métis community by birth, adoption, or other 
means”.53 
What the phrase “other means” encompasses is perhaps deliberately 
left open by the Court. Reading it in the context of the earlier require-
ments, however, would suggest a fairly narrow extension beyond he-
reditary connection. The Court was concerned about perceived arbitrary 
blood quantum cut-offs as has been alleged is created by the Indian Act 
for the definition of Indian. This, however, does not mean that a person 
can claim an ancestral connection simply by virtue of living with and 
among a Métis community. If the Court had intended to permit member-
ship through merely self-identification or acceptance, it would not have 
included the requirement of an ancestral connection. 
As to the criterion of community acceptance, the Court was clear 
that membership in a Métis political organization may be relevant to but 
is not determinative of the question of community acceptance. Further, 
the relevance of membership in a political organization is dependent on 
a contextual understanding of the membership requirements of the or-
ganization and its role in the Métis community. The Court concluded: 
The range of acceptable forms of evidence does not attenuate the need for 
an objective demonstration of a solid bond of past and present mutual 
identification and recognition of common belonging between the claimant 
and other members of the rights-bearing community.54 [Emphasis added.] 
While setting out a fairly straightforward legal test for individual 
membership in a community, the Court was quick to realize that this 
was an area ripe for negotiations. It appreciated that the question of who 
is a Métis has both legal and political dimensions and that, ultimately, 
“[i]n the longer term, a combination of negotiation and judicial settle-
ment will more clearly define the contours of the Métis right to 
hunt…”.55 Until negotiations resolve outstanding identity issues, they 
will fall by default to the courts to decide. This was explicitly recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of Canada which noted that “[i]n the mean-
                                                                                                                                
53
  Powley, id., at para. 32. 
54
  Powley, id., at para. 33. 
55
  Id., at paras. 30 and 50. In addition to negotiating identity issues, the parties may also 
have to deal with a host of other issues including priority rankings between Aboriginal peo-
ples and communities. 
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time, courts faced with Métis claims will have to ascertain Métis iden-
tity on a case-by-case basis”.56  
(b) Practical Evidentiary Considerations 
The test for membership in a community raises serious evidentiary 
concerns. For example, when endeavouring to demonstrate self-
identification, the claimant must show that it is not “made belatedly”.57 
The requisite evidence must come from either the claimant or witnesses 
who know the claimant. Because of the acutely personal, subjective and 
sensitive nature of how one self-identifies or feels about being part of a 
community, the best evidence is clearly from the claimant. Yet this may 
pose a problem in a prosecution where the accused may choose not to 
testify for reasons separate from the Aboriginal claim. In Powley, the 
lower courts expressed some unease with the absence of testimony from 
the claimants. At trial, Vaillancourt J. remarked: 
…oral evidence by the Powleys would have allowed the court a better 
opportunity to assess how the Powleys interact within the Métis 
community of the Sault Ste Marie area. 
Although I agree with Mr. Long that this oversight is a very significant 
omission, it is not in itself fatal to the overall position taken by the 
Powleys.58 [Emphasis added.] 
Sharpe J.A. at the Court of Appeal also commented on this issue: 
While I recognize that an accused person has the right not to testify and 
that the decision to call or not to call an accused will often involve 
difficult tactical considerations for counsel, where a defense is based on 
the assertion of an aboriginal right, it remains an essential element of the 
defense to establish the claimant of the right is a member of the aboriginal 
community. ….. it might have been preferable to have direct evidence 
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  Id., at para. 29. 
57
  Id., at para. 31. 
58
  Powley, reasons at trial, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at paras. 62-
63. 
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from the respondents as to their membership in and acceptance by the 
local Métis community…59. [Emphasis added.] 
In spite of this unease, however, both judges found that the Pow-
ley’s did self-identify as Métis. This was based largely on the fact that 
they wrote their membership number in a Métis organization on a slip of 
paper attached to their moose before they were charged. This suggests 
that, at the end of the day, the threshold for demonstrating self-
identification may be low. 
Demonstrating community acceptance could pose similar difficul-
ties where the political and legal institutions of the community itself are 
not well developed. The various courts in Powley, however, as with self-
identification, have not set a very high threshold. While membership in 
an organization alone will not suffice, participation in some cultural and 
social activities among a group of families in the area who can also trace 
their ancestry to a recognized community, has sufficed to meet the 
community acceptance test.  
In consequence, the ancestral connection will likely be critical to the 
disposition of a claim. In this regard, the trial judge remarked that the 
“current practice of individuals financing independent ancestral searches 
is both cumbersome and expensive”.60 Nevertheless, in Powley, the 
availability of fairly extensive documentation (such as Hudson’s Bay 
Company records, treaty pay lists, various official reports and census 
records), the relatively small number of families that likely form the 
genealogical baseline for the Métis community and the probability that 
many Métis claimants will be closely related suggest that considerable 
progress in tracing ancestral connections can be made at a reasonable 
cost through a co-ordinated effort.  
In Ontario, at least one Métis organization states that it is assem-
bling genealogical evidence in an effort to identify Métis who may hold 
harvesting rights. The Métis Nation of Ontario (“MNO”) issues “Har-
vesters Certificates” to members61 that demonstrate that “he or she is 
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  Powley, reasons of the Court of Appeal, (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at paras. 143, 149, 
[2001] O.J. No. 607. 
60
  Powley, supra, note 58, at para. 38. 
61
  According to the MNO’s website at <http://www.metisnation.org/insideMNO/ 
registry.html>, the MNO presently applies the following definition of Métis in determining 
membership in the MNO: 
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ordinarily resident and intends to participate in the Métis harvest in his 
or her traditional territory which is within the Province of Ontario or 
that a direct ancestor was a beneficiary of an Ontario treaty and that he 
or she is ordinarily resident and intends to participate in the Métis har-
vest in that treaty area”.62 According to the MNO, Harvesters Certificate 
“shall be considered proof that the holder has been verified by the MNO 
Registrar as having provided sufficient documentation to support a 
claim to an Aboriginal or treaty right to harvest”.63  
                                                                                                                                
 1.1 “Métis” means a person who self-identifies as Métis, is distinct from other 
Aboriginal peoples, is of Historic Métis Nation ancestry, and is accepted by the Mé-
tis Nation.  
 Defined Terms in National Definition of Métis  
 1.2 “Historic Métis Nation” means the Aboriginal people then known as Métis 
or Half-breeds who resided in the Historic Métis Nation Homeland. 
 1.3 “Historic Métis Nation Homeland” means the area of land in west central 
North America used and occupied as the traditional territory of the Métis or Half-
breeds as they were then known.  
 1.4 “Métis Nation” means the Aboriginal people descended from the Historic 
Métis Nation which is now comprised of all Métis Nation citizens and is one of the 
“aboriginal peoples of Canada” within the meaning of s.35 of the Constitution Act 
1982.  
 1.5 “Distinct from other Aboriginal peoples” means distinct for cultural and na-
tionhood purposes.  
 
This definition was adopted by the Métis National Council (of which the MNO is a 
member) on September 27-28, 2002. 
Previously, acceptance by the MNO was dependent upon the following criteria: 
 
 2.2 Citizenship in the MNO shall be limited to individuals interested in further-
ing the objects of the MNO and who are Métis within the definition adopted by the 
MNO in accordance with the Métis National Council which is as follows1: 
a) Anyone of Aboriginal ancestry who self-identifies as Métis as distinct from 
Indian or Inuit; has at least one grandparent who is Aboriginal; and whose appli-
cation for admission as a citizen is accepted by the MNO.  
 2.3 A person is entitled to be registered as a citizen of MNO who:  
a) Provides sufficient documentation that he or she is Métis within the meaning 
of 2.2(a); 
b) is not enrolled on any other Aboriginal registry; and 
c) whose application for admission as a citizen has been approved through the 
registry process of the MNO as amended from time to time 
62
  See online, <http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/home.html> and Ar-
ticle 4.4 of the Métis Nation of Ontario 2001 Harvesting Policy online, at 
<http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/harvest_policy.html>. 
63
  Article 4.5 of the Métis Nation of Ontario 2001 Harvesting Policy at 
<http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/harvest_policy.html>. 
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The other large province-wide Métis organization in Ontario, the 
Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association (“OMAA”) appears to only re-
quire its members to attest to the identity and treaty area of ancestors 
who were members of an Indian band64 and issues “Certificates of Abo-
riginal Status” which OMAA advises can “be used for identification 
purposes including, but not limited to… harvesting (hunting, fishing, 
trapping, gathering”).65 Demonstrating that a person can attest to the 
identity and treaty areas of ancestors who were members of Indian 
bands self-evidently is not the same as proving “that the claimant’s 
ancestors belonged to the historic Métis community by birth, adoption, 
or other means”.66 
The final practical concern with identification of Métis rights hold-
ers is a potential difficulty in distinguishing Métis Aboriginal rights 
holders from other rights holders. This concern has been raised by Pro-
fessor Slatterly, who suggests that because many Aboriginal people are 
of mixed-Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry and belong to com-
munities whose distinct cultures originate in both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal influences, it is difficult to distinguish the individuals and 
communities that are Métis as defined in Powley.67 In Powley itself, the 
historical record demonstrated that a “significant number of [Sault Ste. 
Marie Métis] families joined the local Ojibway bands on the near by 
Batchewana and Garden River reserves. By 1890, 191 of 285 Batche-
wana band members were Métis, as were 199 of 412 Garden River band 
members”.68 Descendants of the historic Métis of Sault Ste. Marie con-
tinue to enjoy membership in the Batchewana and Garden River 
bands.69 The Powleys’ own ancestors were recognized as band members 
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  Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association application form, undated. 
65
  See online, <http://www.omaa.org/page_11_Join_or_renew_membership.htm>. 
66
  Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 32, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
67
  At the Pacific Law and Business Foundation’s conference entitled “The Supreme 
Court of Canada Recognizes Métis Rights”, held in Toronto on November 20-21, 2003. 
68
  Powley, reasons of the Court of Appeal (2001), O.R. (3d) 35, at para. 23, [2001] O.J. 
No. 607. 
69
  As of 1999, band councillors for the Batchewana band included Adelene Corbière, 
Joe Sayers, Noel and Holly Syrette and Chief Vernon Syrette. The band council for the 
Garden River band in 1999 included Blaine and Terry Belleau, L.M. and Doreen Lesage, 
Terry and Darrell Boissoneau, Stuart Soulière and Chief Lyle Sayers. All these surnames are 
closely associated with historic Sault Ste. Marie Métis families identified in the 1861 census 
and listed on the Batchewana and Garden River treaty paylists beginning between 1857 and 
1874. 
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from the 1850s until 1918.70 In sum, there can be little doubt that many 
Indians in the Sault Ste. Marie area possess a mixed ancestry heritage 
and strong connections to the historic Sault Ste. Marie Métis commu-
nity.  
Similarly, in “The Promise of Marshall on the Prairies: A Frame-
work for Analyzing Unfulfilled Treaty Promises, Professor Bell and 
Karin Buss remark: 
By 1899, many Aboriginal people in Treaty 8 territory were of mixed 
Indian and European ancestory, making it difficult to distinguish 
“Indians” from "Métis". Many people who entered into treaty, as well as 
those receiving scrip, had mixed Indian and European ancestry and 
included some people believed by officials to be Indians. In certain 
instances, some members of the same family took scrip while others took 
treaty benefits.71  
Some of the potential problems in distinguishing Métis and Indians 
in addressing section 35 rights perhaps can be minimized by ensuring 
that due weight is placed on the importance of self-identification as 
Métis. By way of example, in Sault Ste. Marie itself, there are those that 
self-identify as Métis and those who self-identify as band members. 
Applied to individuals of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ances-
try, the Powley test permits persons of mixed ancestry to either empha-
size their Métis or Indian heritage and to claim rights in line with that 
self-identification.  
It can be argued that such an approach eschews objectivity in that it 
allows individuals whose most immediate and substantial Aboriginal 
connections extend to First Nations rather than distinct Métis communi-
ties to nonetheless assert rights as Métis because they happen to have a 
remote ancestral connection to a distinct historic Métis community and 
prefer, for whatever reasons, to emphasize and rely on this connection. 
However, as long as individuals are not permitted to pick and choose 
their identity simply as it suits them at any given time, there does not 
appear to be any obvious practical defect with such an approach. More-
over, as a matter of principle, it may be more consistent with the tradi-
tional perspective of many Aboriginal peoples as reflected in the 
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  Powley, supra, note 68, at para. 138. 
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  (2000), 63 Sask. L. Rev. 667, at 678. 
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historical fluidity of Aboriginal identity. Doubtlessly historical circum-
stances will be raised that pose challenges for distinguishing between 
Métis and Indian communities, rights and rights holders, but the self-
identification criterion may go a considerable distance in unravelling 
this knot. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Powley case provides a firm foundation upon which to build a 
Métis section 35 Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. It is fundamentally 
based on the First Nation Aboriginal rights model but with some varia-
tion and one critical change. The “pre-contact” requirement for the es-
tablishment of the community is now a “pre-control” requirement. 
Although the jurisprudential underpinnings for this approach are not 
dealt with in any detail by the Court, the concept of pre-control provides 
sufficient clarity to ensure that Métis communities enjoy broad but not 
open-ended constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights. As well, courts 
will be required to more strenuously review claims of community mem-
bership given the absence of legally recognized communities in parts of 
the country. No doubt further litigation will ensue to flesh out those 
areas left open by the Court such as the extent to which ancestral con-
nections may be departed from in determining membership. As well, 
courts will have to grapple with the impact of Powley on other Aborigi-
nal groups. Consultations, negotiations and non-judicial processes will 
also impact on the ultimate shape of Métis Aboriginal rights. The Pow-
ley decision therefore should be regarded as providing a sound first step 
in the ongoing process of defining and refining Métis Aboriginal rights.  
  
 
